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RISKIN v. TOWERS

[24 C.2d

notice, the motion would be based upon it, the affidavit of
merits made by him, the proposed verified answer, "and
upon all the other records and files in the above entitled
cause." In a counter affidavit, Sydney M. Williams, counsel
for the respondent, declared that on January 13, 1942, he
saw Towers served with the summons and complaint. In this
affidavit, Williams also stated facts tending to prove that
Towers had full knowledge of all of the steps taken in the
action being prosecuted against him and that he had not in
good faith proceeded in such a manner as to be entitled to
relief under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It is significant that the notice of motion does not state,
as one of its grounds, that 'rowers had not been served with
process, but only that he "believed" no service had been
made upon him. Nor did he present any affidavit in this regard. True, he said that the motion would be based upon all
the records and files in the action. But assuming that, by
such reference, the affidavits presented to the court in connection with the motion to set aside the service were a part
of the evidence which the court was entitled to and did consider in ruling upon the motion to set aside the default, they
only added more directly contradictory statements concerning the asserted occurrences on January 13, 1942, when it is
claimed that Towers was served. Moreover, the records and
files include a minute order reciting that the prior motion
was heard upon the testimony of Towers, his wife, and Williams, and was denied.
To me, the conclusion is inescapable that upon the motion
to set aside the default and permit the answer of Towers to
be filed, the trial judge was required to determine, upon the
evidence then submitted to him, an issue of fact and that
his order, based upon conflicting evidence, is beyond the
reach of an appellate court. For these reasons, in my opinion,
the order should be affirmed.

May 1944)

MCGREGOR v. STATE BAR

[So F. No. 16969.

In Bank.

283

May 8, 1944.]

LESLIE F. McGREGOR, Petitioner, V. THE STATE BAR
OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent.
[la-lc] Attorneys-Disbarment-Moral Turpitude.-An attorney
was disbarred where the evidence showed that he permitted a
lay employee to use his name as attorney in operating a collection agency, and that money paid on a note was misappropriated, and where the misconduct, in part coincident with and
also extending beyond the period covered by a prior proceeding
resulting in a suspension, disclosed lack of improvement in
appreciation of the ethical standards of the profession.
[2] Id._Disbarment-Mitigating Circumstances.-An attorney is
not entitled to any indulgence by reason of his restitution of
moneys wrongfully retained, especially where made as a matter of expediency and under pressure.
[3] Id. _ Disbarment - Evidence-Prior Record.-In disbarment
proceedings, a prior suspension of the attorney proceeded
against is a proper matter for consideration.

PROCEEDING to review recommendation of disbarment.
Petitioner disbarred.
Leslie F. McGregor, in pro. per., for Petitioner.
Sam J. Anderson and Jerold E. Weil for Respondent.
THE COURT.-This is a proceeding to review the findings
and the recommendation of the Board of Governors of The
State Bar of California that the petitioner be disbarred from
the practice of the law in all the courts of this state.
By an amended notice to show cause the petitioner was
charged with the violation of his oath and duties as an attorney and with the commission of acts involving moral turpitude and dishonesty (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6067, 6068, 6103,
6106) ; and, in particular, with .the violation of section 6105
of said code (lending his name to be used as an attorney by
another person who is not an attorney) and Rule 9 of the
[1] See 9 Ca1.Jur. Ten-year SUPP· 423; 1) Am.Jur. 428.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Attorneys at Law, § 141; [2] Attor"
neys at Law, § 151; [3] Attorneys at Law, § 172(9).
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Rules of Professional Conduct (commingling money belonging to clients with his own funds and failing to report promptly the receipt of money belonging to them, 213 Cal. cxv.)
The petitioner made written answer to these charges but did
not appear either in person or by counsel at any of the three
hearings held in this disciplinary matter before the appointed
local administrative committee, and at which the complaining witnesses and the petitioner's implicated employee testified. From the evidence so before it the committee made findings of fact and conclusions of law adverse to the petitioner
and recommended that he be disbarred. Thereafter the petitioner was notified of his prIvilege to appear before the Board
of Governors for oral argument of his case, but he did not
attend the meeting scheduled for the consideration of his matter or otherwise communicate with the board. Thereupon,
after full discussion of the record, the board adopted, with
slight modification, the findings of fact made by the local
administrative committee and, by a vote of twelve to two, approved the recommendation of the petitioner's disbarment.
In so fixing the degree of discipline, the board took into consideration that another disciplinary matter against the petitioner, likewise concerning contested issues of moral turpitude
and dishonesty in connection with charges of his infraction
of Rule 9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, was pending
before The State Bar and upon which hearings had been held
by a local administrative committee at the time that the alleged misconduct involved in the present proceeding took
place. In said prior matter the board recommended a suspension of ninety days, the petitioner did not seek a review
in this court, and accordingly he was suspended from the
practice of the law for the mentioned period by order of this
court dated March 1, 1943 (In re Suspension of McGregor,
Bar Misc. 1749), some six months before the board's recommendation of disbarment in the present proceeding.
Upon this application for review the petitioner advances
two arguments: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the determination of the board; and (2) the impropriety
of its reference to his past record of suspension in fixing the
measure of discipline herein.
[la] In the findings, as modified, the facts involved in the
present proceeding are recited substantially as follows: For
some time prior to February, 1942, and for several months
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thereafter, the petitioner maintained his law office and a collection agency at the same location in San Francisco. To as~
sist him in his business, the petitioner employed one Peter
Lorenzo, who was not a member of the bar but who was given
wide authority in the performance of his duties and allowed
to use the petitioner's name as an attorney at law in carrying
on correspondence and acknowledging receipts of money in
connection with the conduct of the collection agency. The
latter activity appeared to be so interwoven with the petitioner's legal business that it was difficult to distinguish between the two in the allocation of services rendered; however, Lorenzo was paid by the petitioner from his own fundfl,
and not by the collection agency as a separate entity.
'
Sometime in February, 1942, one Harry Pickering called
at the office of the petitioner for the purpose or employiilg
him to collect the balance of $55 due on a promissory ilote
made in favor of Pickering and his wife. Pickering was seek~
ing the services of an attorney and not of a collection agency.
He was interviewed by a man in the office whom he believed
to be the petitioner, but who answered the description of Lorenzo; and it was then agreed between the two that the fee
would be contingent upon the successful completion of the
undertaking and in such event, would be one-half of the col~
lection. Thereafter two progress reports written on the petitioner's letterhead-one dated February 25, 1942, and the
other July 15, 1942-each bearing the petitioner's signature
and setting forth the efforts being made to locate the debtor,
were sent to Pickering. Lorenzo admitted having signed the
petitioner's name to these reports and stated that on many
other occasions he had followed the same practice with respect
to communications written on the petitioner's legal stationery;
Subsequent to the date last above mentioned the debtor under
the note called at the. petitioner's office on various occasions,
paid the $55 balance in the course of several installments
(August-October 10, 1942), and was given corresponding receipts therefor, each bearing the rubber stamp signature of
the petitioner and none revealing any connection with the
collection agency., Lorenzo stated that he placed the rubber
stamp signature on the receipts in accordance with his custo:mary procedure in handling such matters for the. petitioner:
Neither the petitioner nor Lorenzo made any accounting to
thePickerings with respect to the collection of the $55, or any
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part thereof; no part of said sum was ever paid to them; but
admittedly without the consent of the Pickerings, the whole
amount was commingled with the petitioner's funds and appropriated to his use and benefit. The Pickerings did not
learn of the collection of the $55, or any part of it, until October 10, 1942, the date of the final payment, when the debtor
advised them of the fulfillment of his obligation.
Turning to the record in this matter and, in the review
thereof, according to the petitioner every favorable inference
and intendment, the conclusion is inescapable that he has not
met the burden of showing that the findings of the board, as
above summarized, are erroneous or unsupported by the evidence. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6083.) The adverse determination of the factual issue as to whether the petitioner permitted
his employee, Lorenzo, a layman, to use his name as an attorney at law in the operation of the collection agency is in
direct line with the positive testimony adduced at the hear··
ings in this matter. Thus, after observing that the petitioner's collection business and legal affairs were so intermingled
that it was difficult to distinguish them as regards the rendition of services, Lorenzo stated that in the regular performance of his duties in the management of the petitioner's office
he was authorized to interview clients and fix fees, write letters on the petitioner's legal stationery, sign the latter's name
to the communications, and acknowledge moneys collected on
claims by appropriate receipts bearing the petitioner's rubber
stamp signature. In particular as here involved, Lorenzo
identified the above-mentioned two progress reports addressed
to the Pickerings in February and July, 1942, and the receipts
given to the debtor under the Pickering note as typical of his
authorized use of the petitioner's name in business transactions concerning the affairs of clients with the office. Pickering testified that when he entered the petitioner's office seeking the services of an attorney, he was interviewed by a man
answering the description of Lorenzo but who, from the tenor
of their discussion fixing the fee arrangements in connection
with the collection matter, Pickering assumed was the petitioner. Lorenzo admitted Pickering's description andrecalled, though vaguely in view of the lapse of time and the
many similar matters he handled in the interim, the circumstances of the particular interview.
While the petitioner claims that he instructed Lorenzo to
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"close out" the collection business in the early part of 1942, a
procedure which, according to the petitioner, would require
several months to complete, Lorenzo emphatically denied that
he had been so directed and maintaIned that he, as a trusted
employee and during the petitioner's absence, only continued
to manage the latter's office in the same manner as he had for
some years previously. It appears that in the year 1942 the
petitioner, by reason of his employment in a defense plant,
was absent from his office a considerable portion of each day,
frequently not going there until late in the afternoon or evening; yet, according to Lorenzo, the petitioner in his daily
visits was maintaining an active contact with his business and
was, in fact, "conducting" it when Lorenzo left the petitioner's employ in October of that year to do government work.
Thus, Lorenzo testified that all moneys collected by him in
the petitlOner's absence were placed in a cashbox and called
to the petitioner's attention on his return; that if he, Lorenzo,
left the office when the petitioner was not there, he always
would leave a note informing the petitioner of what had transpired in his absence, including a reference to any collections
which might be found in the cashbox; and that the petitioner
customarily took care of all bank deposits himself.
That there is no evidence that the petitioner ever heard of
or dealt with the Pickering matter is of no consequence here.
What is important under the circumstances is the fact that
it can readily be inferred from the record that Lorenzo represented himself as the petitioner in all his dealings with the
Pickerings and that he was authorized to do so as part of the
regular performance of his office duties; and the petitioner
admits, in his application for review by this court, that the
"ultimate responsibility of the (Pickering) case would be"
his.
With respect to the issue of the petitioner's improper retention of funds belonging to the Pickerings as the result of
the installment payments by the debtor under their note, the
evidence is indisputably unfavorable to the petitioner. The
two progress reports of February and July, 1942, as above
mentioned, simply recited efforts of the petitioner's office to
locate the debtor; the subsequent collection of the moneys due
on the not0 apparently were never communicated by Lorenzo
or the petitioner to the Pickerings, who first learned of the
payments from the debtor on the day the last one was made,
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October 10, 1942. The receipts for the respective sums
credited against the note-exhibits in the record-conclusively
establish, of course, that the full $55 balance was paid into
the petitioner's office. Although in his answer filed in this
disciplinary proceedings, the petitioner averred that he "has
ascertained that the money is due the said Pickerings and
has caused to be issued a remittance to them," no evidence
of such reimbursement was offered by him or in his behalf at
the hearings before the local administrative committee or the
Board of Governors. [2] But even were the petitioner's
allegation conceded to be the fact, the restitution of moneys
wrongfully retained, especially where made as a matter of
expediency and under pressure, does not entitle an attorney
to any indulgence. (Maggart v. State Bar, 7 Cal.2d 495 [61
P.2d 451]; Narlian v. State Bar, 21 Ca1.2d 876 [136 P.2d
553]. )
[lb] There is no legal justification for the petitioner's
misconduct as thus charged and found upon compelling evidence. His method of doing business in the manner depicted,
indicating a lack of those qualities essential to the maintenance of the dignity and integrity of the profession and the
protection of the public, comes within the definition of "moral
turpitude" as the term 1S used in bar matters. As was said
in Townsend v. State Bar, 210 Cal. 362, 364 [291 P. 837] :
"The right to practice law not only presupposes in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the
exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking
of the nature of a public trust. It is manifest that the powers
and privileges derived from it may not with propriety be
delegated to or exercised by a nonlicensed person." Moreover, as noted by the Board of Governors in its recommendation to this court, the misconduct subject of the present proceeding covered a period in part coincident with, and also
extending beyond, the hearing of another disciplinary charge
against the petitioner by a local administrative committee of
The State Bar. Such prior matter, involving considerations
of "moral turpitude" in connection with an objectionable
accounting practice, terminated adversely for the petitioner;
he did not challenge the consequent disciplinary recommendation of the Board of Governors; and finality was reached
therein upon the order of this court in March, 1943, suspending him from practice for ninety days. (In re Suspension of
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McGregor, Bar Misc. 1749, supra.) [3] As so concluded
some six months prior to the board's determination of the
present proceeding, the prior suspension was an appopriate
consideration herein. (Mills v. State Bar, 6 Ca1.2d 565, 567
[58 P.2d 1273] ; Dudney v. State Bar, 8 Ca1.2d 555, 562-563
[66 P.2d 1199] ; Petersen v. State Bar, 21 Ca1.2d 866, 871 [136
P .2d 561].) [lc] I ts particular significance here rests upon
the fact that the petitioner, while undergoing investigation for
the act of dishonesty there involved and subsequently established, committed still further acts of a similar nature. It is
apparent therefrom that the disciplinary considerations inherent in the prior charge did not improve the petitioner's
appreciation of the ethical standards of the profession or impress him with his responsibilities in handling the affairs of
clients. The State Bar Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, chap. 4) is
designed to provide a procedure whereby those attorneys at
law who prove recreant to their trust may be removed from
the practice. As was said in Dudney v. State Bar, supra, at
page 563: "The purpose of disbarment proceedings is not to
punish the individual but to determine whether the attorney
should continue in that capacity." These considerations in
conjunction with the facts in the present proceeding as disclosed by the record herein fully justified the action and determination of the board.
It is ordered that the petitioner be disbarred from the practice of law in all of the courts of this state and that his name
be stricken from the roll of attorneys, this order to be effective thirty days from the filing of this decision.
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